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Abstract
We analyze nonlinear pricing with finite information. A seller offers a menu to a
continuum of buyers with a continuum of possible valuations. The menu is limited to
offering a finite number of choices representing a finite communication capacity between
buyer and seller.
We identify necessary conditions that the optimal finite menu must satisfy, either
for the socially effi cient or for the revenue-maximizing mechanism. These conditions
require that information be bundled, or “quantized” optimally. We show that the loss
resulting from using the n-item menu converges to zero at a rate proportional to 1/n2.
We extend our model to a multi-product environment where each buyer has pref-
erences over a d dimensional variety of goods. The seller is limited to offering a finite
number n of d-dimensional choices. By using repeated scalar quantization, we show
that the losses resulting from using the d-dimensional n-class menu converge to zero
at a rate proportional to d/n2/d. We introduce vector quantization and establish that
the losses due to finite menus are significantly reduced by offering optimally chosen
bundles.
Keywords: Mechanism Design, Nonlinear Pricing, Multi-Dimension, Multi-
Product, Private Information, Limited Information, Quantization, Infor-
mation Theory.
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The theory of mechanism design addresses a wide set of questions, ranging from the design
of markets and exchanges to the design of constitutions and political institutions. A central
result in the theory of mechanism design is the “revelation principle”which establishes that
if an allocation can be implemented incentive compatible in any mechanism, then it can
be truthfully implemented in the direct revelation mechanism, where every agent reports
his private information, his type, truthfully. Yet, when the amount of private information
(the type space) of the agents is large, the direct revelation mechanism requires the agents
to have abundant capacity to communicate with the principal, and the principal to have
abundant capacity to process information. By contrast, the objective of this paper is to study
the performance of optimal mechanisms, when the agents can communicate only limited
information and/or when the principal can process only limited information. We pursue
the analysis in the context of a representative, but suitably tractable, mechanism design
environment, namely the canonical problem of nonlinear pricing. Here the principal, the
seller, is offering a variety of choices to the agent, the buyer, who has private information
about his willingness-to-pay (preference or type) for the product.
The distinct point of view, relative to the seminal analysis by Mussa and Rosen (1978)
and Maskin and Riley (1984), resides in the fact that the information conveyed by the
agents, and subsequently the menu of possible choices offered by the seller, is finite, rather
than uncountable as in the earlier analysis. The limits to information may arise for various,
direct or indirect, reasons. On the demand side, it may be too diffi cult or too complex for
the buyer to communicate his exact preferences and resulting willingness to pay to the seller.
On the supply side, it may be too time-consuming for the seller to process the fine detail
of the consumer’s preferences, or to identify the consumer’s preferences across many goods
with close attributes and only subtle differences.
Our analysis adopts a linear-quadratic specification (analogous to that of Mussa and
Rosen (1978) and Maskin and Riley (1984)) in which the consumer’s gross utility is the
product of his willingness-to-pay (his type θ) and the consumed quantity (or quality) q of
the product, whereas the cost of production is quadratic in the quantity (quality). For
this important case, we reveal an interesting connection between the problem of optimal
nonlinear pricing with limited information to the problem of optimally quantizing a source
signal by using a finite number of representation levels in information theory. In our setting,
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the socially effi cient quantity (quality) q for a customer should be equated to his valuation
θ if a continuum of choices were available. In the case where a finite number of choices are
accessible, q can take on only some values. If we see θ as the source signal and q as the
representation level, then the total social welfare can be written in terms of the mean square
error between the source signal and the representation signal. Given this, the social welfare
maximization problem can be characterized by the Lloyd-Max optimality conditions, a well-
established result in the theory of quantization. Furthermore, we can extend the analysis
to the revenue maximization problem, after replacing the customer’s true valuation by the
corresponding virtual valuation. We estimate the welfare and revenue loss resulting from the
use of a finite n-item menu (relative to the continuum menu). In particular, we characterize
the rate of convergence for the welfare and revenue loss as a function of n. We examine
this problem first for a given distribution on the customer’s type, and then over all possible
type distributions with finite support. We establish that the maximum welfare loss and
the maximum revenue loss shrink towards zero at the rate proportional to 1/n2. To our
best knowledge, this is the first time that quantization theory has been applied to solve the
problem of mechanism design with limited information in economics.
Our approach extends naturally, via vector quantization, to the multi-dimensional non-
linear pricing problem where the seller is offering a variety of heterogeneous products to the
buyer who has private information about his preferences (types) for these products charac-
terized by a vector. Under the linear-quadratic specification in multiple dimensions, if we
view the private information (the preference or type vector) as the signal vector and his
choice (quantity or quality vector) as the representation vector, the social welfare maximiza-
tion problem and the revenue maximization problem can be characterized by the Lloyd-Max
optimality conditions for vector quantization. We estimate the welfare and revenue loss re-
sulting from the use of d-dimensional finite menu with n choices. We establish an upper
bound on the welfare loss and the revenue loss by using repeated scalar quantization where
we simply partition the type space with orthotopes (Cartesian product of intervals in mul-
tiple dimensions), and treat each dimension independently. However, this method is not
consistent with the Lloyd-Max conditions in general, and thus is not optimal. Lookabaugh
and Gray (1989) provided a significant decomposition theorem, which indicates that we can
considerably improve the upper bound by using more subtle vector quantization methods
to design the multi-product finite menus over the entire type space. This improvement re-
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sults from the vector quantization gain which consists of three components: space-filling
advantage, shape advantage, and dependence advantage. Most notably, even in the extreme
case when the types are distributed independently and uniformly across all dimensions, the
vector quantization method can still reduce the welfare loss and the revenue loss, due to the
space-filling advantage. This is the main reason why we bundle the consumer’s preferences
over multiple goods as a vector, instead of viewing them separately as independent types.
We then establish the vector-quantization-based upper bound and the lower bounds on the
welfare loss and the revenue loss.
The role of limited information in mechanism design has recently attracted increased
attention. McAfee (2002) phrases the priority rationing problem as a two-sided matching
problem (between consumer and services) and shows that a binary priority contract (“coarse
matching”) can already achieve at least half of the social welfare that could be generated by
a continuum of priorities. Hoppe, Moldovanu, and Ozdenoren (2010) extend the matching
analysis and explicitly consider monetary transfers between the agents. In particular, they
present lower bounds on the revenue which can be achieved with specific, not necessarily op-
timal, binary contracts. By contrast, Madarasz and Prat (2010) suggest a specific allocation,
the “profit-participation”mechanism to establish approximation results, rather than finite
optimality results, in the nonlinear pricing environment. While the above contributions are
concerned with single agent environments, there have been a number of contributions to
multi-agent mechanisms, specifically single-item auctions among many bidders. Blumrosen,
Nisan, and Segal (2007) consider the effect of restricted communication in auctions with
either two agents or binary messages for every agent. Kos (2012) generalizes the analysis
by allowing for a finite number of messages and agents. In turn, their equilibrium charac-
terization in terms of partitions shares features with the optimal information structures in
auctions as derived by Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2007).
Closer to our approach is Wilson (1989) which considers the impact of a finite number of
priority classes on the effi cient rationing of services. His analysis is less concerned with the
optimal priority ranking for a given finite class, and more with the approximation properties
of the finite priority classes. Wilson (1989) showed that the social welfare loss due to the use
of a finite number of priority classes converges to zero at a rate no faster than 1/n2, where n is
the number of classes. The analysis in Wilson (1989), however, is limited to one-dimensional
social welfare maximization, and is not easily generalizable to the multi-dimensional social
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welfare maximization problem or the revenue maximization problem. The latter problems
have remained open in general. In earlier and preliminary work, Bergemann, Shen, Xu, and
Yeh (2012a), we suggested the use of the quantization technique to obtain upper and lower
bounds on worst-case welfare and revenue loss. In an extension, Bergemann, Shen, Xu, and
Yeh (2012b), we suggested that the welfare analysis may extend to the multi-dimensional
welfare maximization problem. The present contribution represents the first systematic and
comprehensive solution to these problems in many dimensions.
Even in the absence of communication constraints, the multi-dimensional mechanism
design does not represent a trivial generalization of its one-dimensional counterpart. In
many environments of interest, the preference of an individual agent cannot be summarized
by a mere scalar but is more suitably represented as a vector. A real-life example would be a
customer who has to make his choices in a supermarket where a large variety of commodities
are available. Hence, designing a smart pricing strategy (e.g., product bundling by offering a
combination of several distinct products for joint sale rather than selling each item separately)
is of first-order concern in practice. In this respect, Wilson (1993) and Armstrong (1996) are
two notable early contributions with explicit solutions to specific multi-dimensional screening
problems. Rochet and Chone (1998) developed a systematic approach, coined the dual
approach, to a general class of environments and pointed to the prevalence of bunching
(agents with different type profile making the same choices). We refer readers to Rochet and
Stole (2003) for a detailed survey of multi-dimensional screening problems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce the basic nonlinear pricing
model in the next section. In Section 3 and 4, we establish the link to the quantization
problem in information theory. With this perspective, we introduce the Lloyd-Max conditions
that the optimal finite menu have to satisfy. By designing a sequence of specific menus, we
estimate the convergence rate of the losses due to information constraints in finite menus. In
Section 5, we generalize our approach to the multi-product environment. Using the repeated
scalar quantization method, we provide an upper bound which is helpful for estimating
the convergence rate of the losses. We then introduce the vector quantization gain and the
decomposition theorem, and derive the vector-quantization-based upper bound and the lower
bounds on the losses. We present some examples to illustrate the benefit of the multi-product




We consider a monopolist facing a continuum of heterogeneous consumers. Each consumer
is characterized by a quasi-linear utility function:
U (θ, q) = u (θ, q)− t (q) ,
where q is the quantity (or quality) of his consumption purchased from the monopolist, θ
measures his particular taste for this good (called his “type"), and t is the monetary transfer.
The monopoly seller offers q units of the product at a cost c (q), resulting in the revenue
Π (q, t) = t (q)− c (q) .
We assume that ∂u/∂q > 0, ∂u/∂θ > 0 and ∂2u/∂q∂θ > 0. The distribution function of θ is




, where 0 < θ̄ ≤ ∞. It is assumed that F is commonly





Throughout the paper, we assume that:




i.e., a multiplicative, separable utility and a quadratic cost function. This setting, usually
called the linear-quadratic model, has been extensively used in the literature (see Mussa and
Rosen (1978)). In this case, the type θ represents the willingness to pay for an additional
unit of the object. With the quadratic cost function, the socially effi cient quantity (quality)
for a consumer is equal to willingness to pay, his type θ.
3 Welfare Maximization
We first consider the social welfare maximization problem. In the presence of private in-
formation, it is well known that the socially effi cient allocation can be implemented by a
direct mechanism (q (θ) , t (θ)), where the transfers t (θ) represent the (social) cost of provid-
ing the object. Thus, in the effi cient direct mechanism, the consumers are offered a menu
{q (θ)}θ∈[0,θ̄] in which the consumer with type θ is allocated the quantity (quality) q (θ).
This effi cient mechanism, as a special case of the Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism, satis-
fies two sets of constraints, namely the individual rationality (or participation) constraint:




, and the incentive constraint: θq (θ)−t (θ) ≥ θq (θ′)−t (θ′)
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. The participation constraint guarantees that the buyer receives a non-
negative net utility from his choice, and the incentive constraints account for the fact that θ
is private information to the buyer, and hence the revelation of the information is required
to be incentive compatible.









It follows that for a consumer with type θ, it is socially optimal to provide a production level
equal to his type:
q∗ (θ) = θ.
The resulting maximized social welfare is given by:



















sponding continuum of allocations, hence our definition for SW ∗ (∞). By contrast, we are
interested in finding the optimal menu when each buyer can communicate his type only in
a finite language, or equivalently, when the seller can process only finitely many different
messages, or equivalently, when the seller can produce only finitely many alternative versions
of his product.
3.1 n-Item Menu
Thus we consider the optimal design of a finite menu. The menu is composed of n < ∞
different allocations {qk} , k = 1, . . . , n, where qk is the quantity (quality) of the k−th item






0 = θ0 ≤ θ1 ≤ . . . ≤ θn = θ̄.
A consumer with type θ ∈ Ak selects q (θ) = qk. {Ak, qk}nk=1 describes a finite menu (and its
associated assignment), called an n-item menu henceforth. LetMF be the set of all n-item




need not consist of intervals. Due to the nature of the optimization
problem in (3), however, it can be shown that the optimal partition consists of intervals.
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menus for a given distribution F :
MF ,
{
{Ak, qk}nk=1 : Ak = [θk−1, θk) , 0 = θ0 ≤ θ1 ≤ . . . ≤ θn = θ̄
}
.
We wish to choose a finite menu fromMF to maximize the expected social welfare:










Since the distribution function F of θ is known, maximizing the expected social welfare in
(2) is equivalent to minimizing
Eθ
[







The key to our approach is the realization that if we view θ as a continuous signal which
must be represented by a representation point qk in the interval Ak, then this is an instance
of the quantization problem in information theory, where the intervals {Ak}nk=1 and the










Thus we may view any finite menu {Ak, qk}nk=1 as the solution to a scalar quantization
problem. Henceforth, we use the terms quantizer and finite menu interchangeably.
3.2 Scalar Quantizer
It is well known that the optimal scalar quantizer or finite menu {A∗k, q∗k}
n
k=1 must satisfy
the following Lloyd-Max conditions (see Chapter 6.2, Gersho and Gray (2007)).
Theorem 1 (Lloyd-Max Optimality Conditions)










, which maximizes the social welfare









, k = 1, . . . , n− 1; (4)
q∗k = E [θ|θ ∈ A∗k] , k = 1, . . . , n; (5)








k+1, must be the arithmetic
average of q∗k and q
∗
k+1. At the same time, q
∗







, must be the conditional mean for θ given that θ falls in this interval.
We now consider the optimal scalar quantization for the uniform distribution as an ex-
ample to illustrate how the Lloyd-Max conditions are used to obtain the optimal finite menu.
The resulting boundary points {θ∗k}
n
k=0 as well as the representation points {q∗k}nk=0 share the
uniformity with the underlying distribution of the values.
Corollary 1 (Optimal Finite Menu for Uniform Distribution)


















, k = 1, . . . , n.
To obtain Corollary 1, note that the conditional mean in any interval Ak is clearly given















, k = 1, . . . , n.
Hence, θ∗k+1 − 2θ∗k + θ∗k−1 = 0. Note that θ∗0 = 0, θ∗n = 1, and thus we have a unique solution















, k = 1, . . . , n.
For certain simple distributions (e.g., the uniform distribution and simple discrete dis-
tributions), it is possible to obtain the closed form of the optimal finite menus from the
Lloyd-Max conditions. For general distributions, closed form solutions are often diffi cult
to obtain. On the other hand, Lloyd-Max conditions imply a useful iterative algorithm for
searching for the optimal menu {A∗k, q∗k}
n
k=1 (see Chapter 6.2, Gersho and Gray (2007)).
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3.3 Welfare Loss of n-Item Menu
We are interested in how well the optimal n-item menu {A∗k, q∗k}
n
k=1 can approximate the
performance of the optimal continuous menu {q∗ (θ)}θ∈[0,θ̄] as measured by the welfare loss
SW ∗ (∞)− SW ∗ (n).
Definition 1 (Welfare Loss)
For a given distribution function F , the welfare loss induced by the optimal n-item menu,
relative the optimal continuous menu, is defined by:
L (F ;n) , SW ∗ (∞)− SW ∗ (n) .
It is easy to see that a tight lower bound on the welfare loss over all distributions is








for k = 1, ..., n. In what follows, we will focus on the upper bound on the
welfare loss over all distributions with finite support, which we normalize without loss of
generality to be [0, 1]. Thus, let F be the set of all distribution functions on [0, 1]. Our main
task is to estimate the worst-case behavior of the welfare loss over all distributions F ∈ F .
Definition 2 (Maximum Welfare Loss)
The maximum welfare loss induced by the optimal n-item menu over all distribution function
F ∈ F is defined by
L (n) , sup
F∈F
L (F ;n) .
Before we discuss the general case, we first consider the uniform distribution, for which
the welfare loss can be exactly established, and a fortiori the resulting convergence rate as
n increases.
Proposition 1 (Welfare Loss for Uniform Distribution)
With a uniform distribution of types, θ ∼ U [0, 1], the welfare loss is L (FU ;n) = 1/ (24n2).






/n, and thus the expected social welfare is

































, which gives us the welfare loss: L (FU ;n) = 1/24n2.
A direct calculation of the welfare loss requires the explicit form of the optimal finite
menu, as determined by the Lloyd-Max conditions. In general, however, this is a diffi cult
problem. We therefore design a sequence of finite menus to obtain an upper bound on the
welfare loss. In these menus, the boundary points are uniformly spaced, and the quantities
{qk} are consistent with the Lloyd-Max condition (5). This construction allows us to estimate
how fast the maximum welfare loss converges to zero as the number of classes n tends to
infinity.
For any F ∈ F , the social welfare corresponding to an n-class menu {Ak, qk}nk=1 ∈ MF
is:




























Therefore, the welfare loss induced by the optimal n-class menu is














[F (θk)− F (θk−1)]
∫
Ak
(θ − qk)2 dFk (θ) ,




F (θk)−F (θk−1) is the conditional distribution function on the interval
Ak = [θk−1, θk).
To proceed, we consider a more constrained set of n-class menus:
M′F ≡ {{Ak, qk}
n
k=1 ∈MF : qk = E [θ|θ ∈ Ak] , 1 ≤ k ≤ n} .
That is,M′F includes all n-class menus {Ak, qk}
n
k=1 consistent with the optimality condition
(5). Note that the optimal menu {A∗k, q∗k}
n
k=1 lies inM′F . Then we can write






[F (θk)− F (θk−1)]
∫
Ak







[F (θk)− F (θk−1)] var [θ|θ ∈ Ak] . (6)
Equation (6) holds since qk = E [θ|θ ∈ Ak] for any {Ak, qk}nk=1 ∈M′F .
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To obtain an upper bound on L (F ;n), we develop a key upper bound on the conditional
variance of θ on any given interval.
Lemma 1 If θ is a random variable on [a, b], −∞ < a < b <∞, then var [θ] ≤ 1
4
(b− a)2.
Proof. Consider the random variable θ̂ = 1
b−a (θ − a) on [0, 1]. Note that var [θ] =
(b− a)2 var[θ̂], so we just need to show var[θ̂] ≤ 1
4
. Since θ̂
2 ≤ θ̂ for any θ̂ ∈ [0, 1], E[θ̂2] ≤
E[θ̂]. Let u = E[θ̂]. Then var[θ̂] = E[θ̂
2
]− (E[θ̂])2 ≤ u− u2 ≤ 1
4
.
Proposition 2 (Upper Bound on Welfare Loss)
For any F ∈ F , and n ≥ 1, the welfare loss of the optimal n-item menu L (F ;n) ≤ 1/8n2.
Proof. For any F ∈ F , consider a particular sequence of n-item menus {A′k, q′k}
n
k=1 ∈



















, k = 1, . . . , n.
That is, the boundary points {θ′k}
n
k=0 are uniformly spaced over [0, 1], and the quantities
{q′k}
n
k=1 are consistent with the Lloyd-Max condition (5). Then by (6), we have




































Hence, the welfare loss












which establishes the result.
Combining Proposition 2 with our result in Proposition 1 for the uniform distribution,
we see that the maximum welfare loss is of order 1/n2.
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Proposition 3 (Bounds on Maximum Welfare Loss)







≤ L (n) ≤ 1
8n2
.
Proof. Let FU be the uniform distribution function on [0, 1]. From Proposition 1, we
have L (FU ;n) = 124n2 . Therefore, L (n) ≥ L (FU ;n) =
1
24n2
. The upper bound results from
Proposition 2.
A version of the one-dimensional social welfare maximization problem in (2) was con-
sidered earlier in Wilson (1989). He obtained an approximate solution to (2) by uniformly
quantizing the distribution function of θ, and by expanding the social welfare on each quanti-
zation interval by the Taylor series around zero up to the order of 1/n3, where n is the total
number of intervals. He also established that the effi ciency loss resulting from an n-item
menu is of order no more than 1/n2, i.e., SW (n) ≥ SW ∗ (∞) − O (1/n2). This approach,
however, is diffi cult to generalize to higher dimensions, and cannot be easily used to solve
the revenue maximization problem.
In contrast to the approach in Wilson (1989), we establish an underlying connection
between the problem of nonlinear pricing with limited information and the quantization
problem in information theory. We quantize the type space directly, and introduce the
Lloyd-Max conditions that the optimal finite menu must satisfy. We then choose a specific









, where the q′k’s are consistent with the Lloyd-
Max conditions and the θ′k’s are uniformly spaced, to provide the upper bound on the
welfare loss. To our knowledge, we are the first to explore the connection between pricing
and quantization.
Compared with Wilson (1989)’s technique, our quantization approach is more direct, and
has several significant advantages. First, quantization theory provides not only the Lloyd-
Max conditions that the optimal finite menu must satisfy, but also an iterative algorithm to
construct an optimal finite menu. Second, by using quantization theory in the type space
directly, we establish a connection between the finite menu for revenue maximization and that
for welfare maximization. This allows us to use similar techniques to prove the convergence
rate of the revenue loss. Finally, our approach extends naturally, via the general technique
of vector quantization, to the multi-dimensional environment.
2Given two functions f (n) and g (n), we write f (n) = Θ (g (n)) if c1g(n) ≤ f(n) ≤ c2g(n) for some
constants c1 and c2, as n becomes large.
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4 Revenue Maximization
We now analyze the problem of revenue maximization. In contrast to the social welfare
problem, here, the seller wishes to design a menu {q(θ), t(θ)}θ∈[0,θ̄] to maximize his expected
net revenue, i.e. the difference between the gross revenue that he receives from the buyer
minus the cost of providing the demanded quantity (quality):










As before, the contract offered has to satisfy two sets of constraints, namely the incentive
constraints and the individual rationality (or participation) constraints. As usual, we can
use the incentive constraints to eliminate the transfers and rewrite the problem in terms of
the allocation alone. The revenue maximization problem can therefore be transformed into
a welfare maximization problem (without incentive constraints) as long as we replace the
true valuation θ of the buyer with the corresponding virtual valuation:
ψ (θ) , θ − 1− F (θ)
f (θ)
. (7)
The virtual valuation is below the true valuation, and the inverse of the hazard rate [1− F (θ)] /f (θ)
accounts for the information rent, the cost of the private information, as perceived by the
principal in the optimal mechanism. With this standard transformation of the problem, the
expected revenue of the seller (without communication constraints) is:
Π∗ (∞) = Eθ
[





and the resulting optimal contract exhibits:
q∗ (θ) = max {ψ (θ) , 0} (8)
We identify the lowest value θ at which the virtual valuation attains a nonnegative value as
θ , min {θ |ψ (θ) ≥ 0} ,
and hence the corresponding revenue is
Π∗ (∞) = Eθ
[









ψ2 (θ) dF (θ) . (9)
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We hasten to add the caveat that the above solution is subject to the requirement that the
virtual valuation (7) is monotone. By contrast, if the virtual valuation fails to be monotone,
then the optimal solution q∗ (θ) has to display flat parts due to the familiar ironing argument
of Myerson (1979). For our analysis, it turns out the critical bounds are established by distri-
butions that generate monotone virtual valuations, see the discussion following Proposition
6, and thus the restriction to monotone or “regular environments”in the words of Myerson
(1979) is without loss of generality.
4.1 n-Item Menu
The current problem is then identical to the seminal analysis by Mussa and Rosen (1978)
and Maskin and Riley (1984) with the following important exception: the buyer can access
only a finite number of choices due to the limited communication with the seller. Now, a
menu of quantity (quality)-price bundles is designed by the monopolistic seller to extract as
much profit as possible. In a finite menu, the seller can offer only a finite number of pairs
{qk, tk}nk=1 to the consumer. Let Ak = [θk−1, θk) , k = 0, . . . , n, represent the partition of[
0, θ̄
]
with boundary values θ−1 = 0, θn = θ̄ ≤ ∞. If θ ∈ Ak, 1 ≤ k ≤ n, the consumer
chooses q (θ) = qk and pays t (θ) = tk. In the revenue maximization setting, the seller will
exclude consumers with low type from the market so that θ0 is bounded away from zero
and is endogenously determined. All consumers whose types are lower than θ0 are meant to
choose q0 = 0 and pay t0 = 0.
Due to the monotonicity of ψ (θ), we can relabel the type θ directly in terms of the
corresponding virtual valuation θ̂:
θ̂ , ψ (θ) = θ − 1− F (θ)
f (θ)
,
and define the associated intervals {Ak}nk=1 directly in terms of the new variable θ̂:




, 1 ≤ k ≤ n,










= G (ψ (θ)) , F (θ) .
16
Then the revenue of an n-item menu can be written in terms of the virtual type θ̂:













and the revenue of the optimal n-item menu is given by















, 0 = θ̂−1 < θ̂0 ≤ θ̂1 ≤ . . . ≤ θ̂n = θ̄
}
.
The problem is now formally equivalent to the earlier welfare maximization problem (2). As
before, we consider the revenue loss induced by the optimal n-item menu in terms of the
distribution function F and the number n of allowed items.
Definition 3 (Revenue Loss)
For a given distribution function F , the revenue loss induced by the optimal n-item menu
compared with the optimal continuous menu is:
L̂ (F ;n) , Π∗ (∞)− Π∗ (n) .
We denote the revenue loss by L̂ (F ;n) to emphasize that the relevant random variable
is now the virtual valuation θ̂ rather than the valuation θ itself.
Definition 4 (Maximum Revenue Loss)
The maximum revenue loss induced by the optimal n-item menu over all F ∈ F is:
L̂ (n) , sup
F∈F
L̂ (F ;n) .
We briefly describe the optimal finite menu for the uniform distribution before investi-
gating general distributions.
Proposition 4 (Uniform Distribution)











n+ k + 1
2n+ 1




, k = 0, . . . , n;
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and the corresponding revenue loss is:








k) = 1. From Theorem 1, we know that the optimal
menu must satisfy:













k − 1, k = 1, . . . , n.
We therefore have the following recursive equation:
θ∗k+1 − 2θ∗k + θ∗k−1 = 0, k = 1, . . . , n− 1.
This implies that θ∗k+1 − θ∗k = θ∗k − θ∗k−1 = ∆θ, and thus
θ∗k = θ
∗
0 + k∆θ k = 0, . . . , n.










0− 1 = 2θ∗0+ ∆θ− 1. Therefore, ∆θ = 2θ∗0− 1. Since
θn = 1, we have θ
∗










n+ k + 1
2n+ 1
, k = 0, . . . , n; q∗k =
2k
2n+ 1
, k = 0, . . . , n.
The expected revenue is
Π∗ (n) = Eθ
[





















The optimal continuous menu is: q∗ (θ) = max {2θ − 1, 0}, and the maximum revenue is:
Π∗ (∞) = Eθ
[








and it follows that the revenue loss induced by the optimal n-item menu is given as stated
by L̂ (FU ;n).
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Thus, the convergence rate of the revenue loss induced by the optimal n-item menu for
the uniform distribution is of order 1
n2
, and thus, as expected, identical to the finding of
Proposition 1 for the social welfare maximization environment.
In addition, we find that the seller tends to serve fewer consumers as compared to the case





= θ∗0 (∞). The difference θ∗0 (n)− θ∗0 (∞)
shrinks to 0 as n goes to infinity. This is a consequence of the fact that the seller’s ability
of extracting revenue is more limited in the case of finite menus. To compensate, the seller
would like to reduce the service coverage in order to pursue higher profits.
4.2 Revenue Loss for n-Item Menu
We can now obtain the upper bound on the revenue loss induced by the optimal finite menus,
and then estimate the convergence rate of the maximum revenue loss as the number n of





∈ M̂F , since q0 = 0 for all θ̂ ≤ θ̂0,
the revenue of the seller can be written as:









































Recall that the revenue resulting from the optimal continuous menu is:
















Therefore, the revenue loss can be written as

































As before, when estimating the upper bound on the revenue losses, we restrict our attention
































∈ M̂′F , we can verify that



































The first term in the square bracket in (11) captures the revenue loss by reducing the service
coverage. The second term is similar to the welfare loss L (F ;n) in (6). The only differ-
ence is the boundary condition θ̂0 > 0. Thus, a technique similar to that used in proving
Proposition 2 can be adapted to this new formulation, leading to an identical upper bound.
Proposition 5 (Upper Bound on Revenue Loss)
For a given F ∈ F , and n ≥ 1, the revenue loss induced by the optimal n-item menu
L̂ (F ;n) ≤ 1
8n2
.
Proof. For the given F ∈ F , and n ≥ 1, choose a sequence {δk}∞k=1 s.t. 0 < δk < 1n ,


































, k = 1, . . . , n;
where θ̂
′
−1,m = 0, q
′
0,m = 0.
Thus by (11), the welfare loss






























































































Hence, for any fixed m ≥ 1, the revenue loss




















Let m→∞. Since limm→∞ δm = 0, we have L̂ (F ;n) ≤ 18n2 .
By Proposition 4 and Proposition 5, the maximum revenue loss converges to zero at a
rate proportional to 1
n2
.
Proposition 6 (Bounds on Maximum Revenue Loss)








≤ L̂ (n) ≤ 1
8n2
.
We mentioned earlier that the exact solution of the continuous menu problem, see (8), is
only valid if the virtual valuation is monotone. If it fails to be monotone, then the solution
q∗ (θ) has to display flat parts due to the familiar ironing argument of Myerson (1979), as any
incentive compatible allocation has to be monotone in the type θ. For our analysis below,
this has two implications: first, in the area where the continuous menu is constant, there is
no loss from using a finite menu; second, in the absence of a monotone virtual valuation, the
corresponding revenue is below the solution indicated by (9). This means that the bounds on
the revenue losses that we obtain for all the distributions with monotone virtual valuation
hold a fortiori for any problem with non-monotone virtual valuation. Thus, the critical
distributions for the bounds on the revenue loss are those with monotone virtual valuations,
for which the above solution (8) of the continuous problem is exact.
5 Multi-Dimensional Type Space
In this section, we consider a multi-dimensional version of the nonlinear pricing problem
which leads to the design of finite menus over multiple products. We demonstrate that
our quantization view generalizes to the multi-dimensional environment, where the optimal
design of finite menus requires the technique of vector quantization. We present bounds on
the welfare and revenue loss arising from the communication constraints. In particular, we
show that in many cases, it is beneficial to bundle the consumer’s preferences over multiple
goods as a vector, instead of treating them separately as independent quantities, thereby
enabling the true joint design of finite menus over multiple goods.
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5.1 Multi-Product Model
We consider a monopolistic firm facing a continuum of consumers and providing d hetero-
geneous goods. Each consumer’s preferences (types) over these goods is characterized by a
d-dimensional vector θ = (θ1, . . . , θd)
T ∈ Rd+, called the consumer’s type vector, where for
1 ≤ l ≤ d, θl represents his preference (type) for good l. Let Θ ⊆ Rd+ denote the com-
pact d-dimensional type space. The joint probability distribution of θ, denoted by F (θ),
is assumed to be commonly known. We denote by Fl the marginal distribution function




< ∞. We assume that the joint den-
sity function f is continuous almost everywhere (a.e.) in the support (i.e., the type space):
Θ =
{
θ ∈ Rd+ : f (θ) > 0
}
.
A customer with type θ consumes the bundle of d goods with the quantity (or quality)
vector q = (q1, . . . , qd)
T by transferring a payment t (q). We assume that the consumer is
characterized by the following quasi-linear utility function:





d×d is a d× d matrix which captures the interactions among different goods.
We assume that φii > 0 for all i so that
∂2u
∂θi∂qi
> 0. It turns out that no further assumptions,
such as invertibility, symmetry or positive-definiteness of Φ, are needed for the analysis which





by providing the vector q. Here, Σ = (σij)d×d is a d× d symmetric positive-definite matrix
which characterizes the interactions in the production of multiple products. All of its diagonal
elements must be positive: σii > 0 for all i. If producing good i raises (reduces) the marginal
cost of producing good j, then we set σij = σji > (<) 0. If σij = σji = 0, the technologies
for producing good i and j are independent. The seller’s revenue is given by:
Π (q, t) = t (q)− c (q) = t (q)− 1
2
qTΣq.
Standard Form We say that the utility and the cost function have the standard form if
Φ = Σ = Id (the d × d identity matrix). In fact, we can always transform the utility and
3By E [θ] <∞, we mean E [θl] <∞ for all 1 ≤ l ≤ d.
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the cost function into the standard form as follows. We diagonalize the symmetric positive-
definite matrix Σ: Σ = P TΛP , where Λ = diag (λ1, ..., λd), λi > 0 is the i-th eigenvalue of







, i = ±1
2
. Then it is easy to show that ATB = Φ and BTB = Σ. If
we introduce the new type vector θ̂ = Aθ and the new quantity (quality) vector q̂ = Bq,
then the consumer’s net utility and the cost function can be written in the standard form in
terms of θ̂ and q̂:













Thus, without loss of generality, we focus on the standard form, assuming that Φ = Σ = Id.
5.2 Welfare Maximization
With a continuous menu, the social welfare is maximized by solving the d−dimensional linear
quadratic program:









and it is socially optimal to provide a quantity (quality) vector equal to the type vector:
q∗ (θ) = θ.
The maximal social welfare therefore equals:














By contrast, in the presence of information (or communication) constraints, the customers
face a finite menu composed of n < ∞ different items {qk} , k = 1, . . . , n. Let {Bk}
n
k=1
represent a partition of the consumer’s type space Θ, i.e., Bi∩Bj = ∅ if i 6= j, and ∪nk=1Bk =
Θ. All consumers with type vector θ ∈ Bk will be allocated the kth quantity (quality) vector
qk. Now, {Bk, qk}
n
k=1 describes a finite multi-product menu, called the n-item menu. As
before, letMF be the set of all n-item menus for a given distribution F :
MF = {{Bk, qk}
n
k=1 : Bi ∩Bj = ∅ if i 6= j, and ∪nk=1 Bk = Θ} .
We choose {Bk, qk}
n
k=1 to maximize the expected social welfare:












When the joint probability distribution of θ is known, maximizing the social welfare in (13)
is equivalent to minimizing
Eθ
[











where ‖·‖ is the Euclidean norm. If we view θ as the signal vector and qk as the representation
vector of θ in the regionBk, then this becomes the d-dimensional n-region vector quantization
problem, where the partition {Bk}nk=1 and the set of representation points {qk}
n
k=1 are jointly
chosen to minimize the mean square error (MSE):








In this manner, any multi-product finite menu {Bk, qk}
n
k=1 can be viewed as a vector quan-
tizer. We can therefore use the two terms “vector quantizer" and “finite multi-product
menu" interchangeably.
As in the one-dimensional case, we investigate how well the optimal n-itemmenu {B∗k, q∗k}
n
k=1
can approximate the performance of the optimal continuous menu {q∗ (θ)}θ∈Θ. We quantify
the welfare loss induced by the optimal finite menu in terms of the joint distribution function
F , the number of items n, and the dimension d.
Definition 5 (Welfare Loss)
For a given joint distribution function F , the welfare loss induced by the optimal n-item
menu compared with the optimal continuous menu is:
L (F ;n; d) , SW ∗ (∞)− SW ∗ (n) .
The welfare loss induced by the optimal n-item menu can be written more explicitly as:

















2 dF (θ) . (15)
We are interested in the worst-case behavior of the welfare loss over all joint distributions
over a d-dimensional support (i.e., the type space) Θ ⊆ Rd+ with positive and finite volume.
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Let b = supθ∈Θ ‖θ‖. Then 0 < b < ∞. We can normalize all type vectors by b so that
the support is Θ ⊆ [0, 1]d. Note that this normalization has no effect on the order of the
convergence rate of the welfare loss. Let F be the set of all joint distribution functions with
the support Θ ⊆ [0, 1]d. Our main task is to quantify the worst-case behavior of L (F ;n; d)
over all distributions F ∈ F .
Definition 6 (Maximal Welfare Loss)
The maximal welfare loss under the optimal n-item menu over all distributions F ∈ F is:
L (n; d) , sup
F∈F
L (F ;n; d) .
In order to prove an upper bound on the welfare loss, we construct a simple d-dimensional





. Such a vector quantizer is called a repeated scalar quantizer.
5.2.2 Repeated Scalar Quantization
Given the joint distribution F ∈ F , for each type θl, 1 ≤ l ≤ d, consider a K-level scalar




{Al,k, rl,k}Kk=1 : Al,k = [θl,k−1, θl,k) , 0 = θl,0 ≤ θl,1 ≤ . . . ≤ θl,n = 1
}
.
We construct the corresponding d-dimensionalKd-region repeated scalar quantizer {B′k, q′k}
Kd
k=1
in the type space [0, 1]d as:
{B′k}
Kd





(r1,k1 , . . . , rd,kd)
T : kl ∈ {1, . . . , K} , 1 ≤ l ≤ d
}
.
One can see that the set of regions {B′k}
Kd
k=1 are orthotopes, i.e., the Cartesian product
of intervals in d dimensions. In the following lemma, we use the repeated scalar quantizer
to obtain a simple upper bound on the welfare loss in multiple dimensions.
Lemma 2






l=1 L (Fl;K), where Fl is the marginal
distribution function of the type θl.
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Proof. See the Appendix. 
Proposition 7 (Upper Bound on Welfare Loss)
For any F ∈ F , n ≥ 1, d ≥ 1, the welfare loss induced by the optimal n-item menu
L (F ;n; d) ≤ d
8 (n1/d − 1)2
, L.




. Since n ≥ Kd, and L (·;n; ·) is a decreasing function of n
according to Definition 5, the welfare loss








By Proposition 2, L (Fl;K) ≤ 18K2 , for all 1 ≤ l ≤ d. Therefore,




8 (n1/d − 1)2
,




≥ n1/d − 1.
Repeated scalar quantization does not result in the optimal n-item menu in general. In-
deed, in higher dimensions, we can use more subtle vector quantization methods to design
better finite menus. To achieve this, we bundle the consumer’s preferences over multiple
goods as a vector, instead of viewing them separately as independent choices. In the follow-
ing, we first introduce the Lloyd-Max conditions that the optimal multi-dimensional finite
menu must satisfy. We then discuss the vector quantization gain, and a significant decom-
position theorem. We use these results to derive a vector-quantization-based upper bound
and lower bound on the welfare loss.
5.2.3 Lloyd-Max Optimality Conditions
Asmentioned above, the social welfare maximization problem can be viewed as a d-dimensional
n-region vector quantization problem. Therefore, the optimal menu {B∗k, q∗k}
n
k=1 must satisfy
the following Lloyd-Max optimality conditions for vector quantization.
Theorem 2 (Lloyd-Max Conditions (Gersho and Gray (2007)))
The optimal n-item menu {B∗k, q∗k}
n
k=1 which maximizes the expected social welfare (13) must
satisfy:
B∗k = {θ ∈ Θ : ‖θ − q∗k‖ ≤ ‖θ − q∗l ‖ for all l = 1, . . . , n} , (16)
q∗k = E [θ|θ ∈ B∗k] . (17)
26
In other words, {B∗k}
n
k=1 is chosen as a Voronoi partition (a set of the nearest-neighbor




k is chosen as the conditional mean of θ given that
θ lies in the region B∗k.
As in the one-dimensional case, it is diffi cult to get the closed form of the optimal finite
menus from the Lloyd-Max conditions for general distributions. Nevertheless, Lloyd-Max
conditions imply a useful algorithm for designing the optimal finite menu in many dimensions
as well (see. Chapter 11.2, Gersho and Gray (2007)).
5.2.4 Vector Quantization Gain










is the welfare loss induced by the optimal d-dimensional Kd-item menu, or equivalently the
optimal vector quantizer which satisfies the Lloyd-Max conditions in Theorem 2. In con-
trast,
∑d
l=1 L (Fl;K) is the welfare loss induced by the repeated scalar quantizer, discussed
in Section 5.2.2. Lemma 2 implies that we can typically reduce the welfare loss by using true
vector quantization rather than repeated scalar quantization to design the finite menus. The
ratio of
∑d




captures this gain, defined as the vector quantization
gain.
Definition 7 (Vector Quantization Gain for Social Welfare)
The vector quantization gain for social welfare is defined by the ratio of the welfare loss





L (F ;Kd; d)
.
To simplify our analysis, we assume from now on that the consumer’s preferences over d
goods, θ1, . . . , θd, are identically, but not necessarily independently distributed. Denote by f
and f̂ the joint density function and the marginal density function, respectively. Lookabaugh
and Gray (1989) showed that, when the number of items per dimension is suffi ciently large,
the vector quantization gain can be decomposed into three terms.
Theorem 3 (Decomposition)
Suppose that the consumer’s preferences over d goods are identically distributed. When the
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number K of items in each dimension becomes suffi ciently large, the vector quantization gain
can be decomposed as follows:
GSW ≈ SF (d)× S(f̂ , d)×DP (f̂ , f, d),
where SF (d), S(f̂ , d), and DP (f̂ , f, d) are called the space-filling advantage, shape advantage
and dependence advantage, respectively.
Space-Filling Advantage Recall that in repeated scalar quantization, we simply choose
orthotopes (Cartesian product of intervals) to partition the type space. When d ≥ 2, how-
ever, we have the freedom to select more complex quantization regions. This leads to the
space-filling advantage. For example, Gersho (1979) showed that the optimal admissible
polygons {B∗k}
n
k=1 yielding the minimum welfare loss for the i.i.d. uniform distribution in R2
are regular hexagons, rather than equilateral triangles or squares.
More generally, when d ≥ 3, it is optimal to choose the admissible polytopes as close
as possible to the d-dimensional sphere. Indeed as the dimension increases, the optimal
admissible polytope becomes geometrically closer and closer to the sphere, leading to an
asymptotic space-filling advantage, limd→∞ SF (d) = πe6 , as established by Conway and
Sloane (1985).
















Given the dimension d, the shape advantage depends solely on the marginal density function
f̂ . The uniform distribution does not provide any shape advantage, and we can easily verify
that S(f̂ , d) = 1, if f̂ is the uniform density.
Dependence Advantage The dependence advantage can be written as
DP
(











(f (θ1, . . . , θd))
d/d+2 dθ1 . . . dθd
](d+2)/d . (19)
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Given the dimension d, the dependence advantage is determined by both the joint density f
and the marginal density f̂ , and thus implicitly by the correlation among the types θ1, . . . , θd.
As expected, we can easily verify that there is no dependence advantage for i.i.d. random
variables, i.e., DP (f̂ , f, d) = 1.
5.2.5 Vector-Quantization-Based Upper Bound on Welfare Loss
By taking into account the vector quantization gain, we obtain an upper bound on the
welfare loss, called the vector-quantization-based upper bound, which is (asymptotically)
tighter than the bound given in Proposition 7.
Proposition 8 (Vector-Quantization-Based Upper Bound)
Suppose that the consumer’s types θ1, . . . , θd are identically distributed with the joint distri-
bution function F ∈ F . When n1/d is suffi ciently large,
L (F ;n; d) ≤ 1
SF × S ×DP ×
d
8 (n1/d − 1)2
=
1
SF × S ×DP L , LV Q.




approximate the number of items per dimension, and F̂ be
the marginal distribution function for each type. When K is suffi ciently large, the vector
quantization gain GSW =
d×L(F̂ ;K)
L(F ;Kd;d)




















SF × S ×DP ×
d
8 (n1/d − 1)2
,
where (a) holds because n ≥ Kd and (b) holds because K ≥ n1/d − 1.
Compared with the upper bound L derived in Proposition 7, the upper bound LV Q differs
in several respects. First, the consumer’s types over multiple products are assumed to be
identically distributed, which is not necessary for L. In addition, unlike the case for L, LV Q
depends on the distributions of the types. Finally, LV Q is an asymptotic upper bound on
L (F ;n; d) when n1/d is suffi ciently large, whereas L is an upper bound for any n ≥ 1, d ≥
1. The vector quantization based upper bound LV Q captures the vector quantization gain
GSW = SF × S × DP , and is useful for explaining the benefit of jointly designing finite
menus in multiple dimensions.
29
Example 1 (Multi-Dimensional Uniform Distribution)
Suppose the types θ1, . . . , θd are i.i.d. uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. If n1/d is suffi ciently




0.703L. Since θ1, . . . , θd are i.i.d. uniformly distributed, there are no shape and dependence
advantages, i.e., S = 1, DP = 1. Therefore, LV Q,1 = 1SF (d)L.
Thus, even for the i.i.d. uniform distribution, by choosing better (more spherical) quan-
tization regions than orthotopes, we obtain an asymptotic upper bound LV Q which is tighter
than L by a factor of 1
SF
, due to the space-filling advantage. This example shows that it is
beneficial, especially in high dimensions, to bundle the consumer’s preferences over multiple
goods as a vector, instead of treating them separately as independent scalar quantities.
5.2.6 Lower Bound on Welfare Loss
From the above discussion, one can see that for the i.i.d. uniform distribution, vector quan-
tization can provide only the space-filling advantage, which is upper bounded by πe
6
. We
combine this result with the welfare loss for the uniform distribution in one dimension to
obtain a lower bound on the welfare loss in higher dimensions.
Lemma 3 (Welfare Loss for I.I.D. Uniform Distribution)
Suppose the types θ1, . . . , θd are i.i.d. uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. If n1/d is suffi ciently








approximate the number of items per dimension, and F̂U be the
(marginal) uniform distribution on [0, 1]. When K̂ is suffi ciently large, the vector quantiza-









f̂U , fU , d
)
. By









f̂U , fU , d
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by Lemma 1. Thus we have


















where (a) holds since n ≤ K̂d and L (·;n; ·) is a decreasing function of n, and (b) holds since
K̂ ≤ n1/d + 1.
Proposition 7 provides an upper bound on the welfare loss for any joint distribution
F ∈ F , and Lemma 3 provides a lower bound on the welfare loss for the i.i.d. uniform
distribution, which is a lower bound on the maximum welfare loss L (n; d). Hence, we have
the following result, which states that the maximal welfare loss induced by the n-item menu
converges to zero at a rate proportional to d
n2/d
as the number of items n tends to infinity.
Proposition 9 (Bounds on Maximum Welfare Loss)











5.3 Multi-Dimensional Revenue Maximization
We complete our analysis by finally considering the revenue maximization problem in many
dimensions. The problem for the seller in the direct mechanism without communication
constraints is given by maximizing






q (θ)T q (θ)
]
,
subject to the individual rationality (participation) constraints: θTq (θ)− t (θ) ≥ 0 and the
incentive constraints: θTq (θ)− t (θ) ≥ θTq (θ′)− t (θ′) for all θ, θ′ ∈ Θ, where Θ ⊆ Rd+ is
the type space. In a seminal contribution, Armstrong (1996) showed that the firm’s revenue
can be written as:
Π∗ (∞) = Eθ
[
ψ (θ)T q (θ)− 1
2




ψ (θ) = h (θ)θ, h (θ) = 1− β (θ)
f (θ)
, β (θ) =
∫ +∞
1
f (rθ) rd−1dr. (20)
The optimal continuous menu satisfies:
q∗ (θ) =
{
ψ (θ) if θ ∈ Θ̃
0 if θ ∈ Θ\Θ̃
,
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where Θ̃ = {θ ∈ Θ : h (θ) ≥ 0} is the active type space. The maximum revenue can therefore
be expressed as:
Π∗ (∞) = Eθ
[
ψ (θ)T q∗ (θ)− 1
2







ψ (θ)T ψ (θ) dF (θ) . (21)
The finite version of the revenue maximization problem specifies a menu which contains
n < ∞ different items. Armstrong (1996) already observed that some consumers with low
type vectors in the active type space Θ̃ will leave the market when a finite menu is offered.
Thus, there exists a region B0 ⊆ Θ̃, determined endogenously, such that all consumers with
θ ∈ B0 will choose q0 = 0, t0 = 0. In this case, {Bk, qk}
n
k=1 characterizes a multi-product






k=0 : q0 = 0, Bi ∩Bj = ∅ if i 6= j, and ∪nk=0 Bk = Θ̃
}
.
The seller chooses {Bk, qk}
n
k=0 to maximize the expected revenue:










Define for θ ∈ Θ̃ = {θ ∈ Θ : h (θ) ≥ 0}, the virtual type vector
θ̂ = ψ (θ) = h (θ)θ. (23)
Let the virtual type space be denoted by Θ̂ = ψ [Θ] =
{
ψ (θ) : θ ∈ Θ̃
}
. As in the one-






of the virtual type space Θ̂ as follows:
θ ∈ Bk ⇔ θ̂ ∈ B̂k = {ψ (θ) : θ ∈ Bk} .
In the virtual space, the expected revenue for an n-item menu can be written as:
Π (n) = Eθ
[













and the expected revenue of the optimal n-item menu is given as:










: q0 = 0, B̂i ∩ B̂j = ∅ if i 6= j, and ∪nk=0 B̂k = Θ̂
}
.
The problem is now formally equivalent to earlier welfare maximization problem (14). We
now consider how well the optimal n-item menu can approximate the performance of the
optimal continuous menu. That is, we consider the revenue loss in terms of the distribution
function F , the number of items n, and the dimension d.
Definition 8 (Revenue Loss)
For any joint distribution function F , the revenue loss induced by the optimal n-item menu
compared with the optimal continuous menu is:
L̂ (F ;n; d) , Π∗ (∞)− Π∗ (n) .
Similar to the case for welfare maximization, we are interested in the worst-case behavior
of the revenue loss over all joint distributions with a d-dimensional support set (i.e., the type
space) with positive and finite volume. Without loss of generality, we may assume the type
space Θ ⊆ [0, 1]d. Our main task is to quantify the worst-case behavior of L̂ (F ;n; d) over
all distributions F ∈ F , where F is the set of all joint distribution functions in type space
Θ ⊆ [0, 1]d.
Definition 9 (Maximum Revenue Loss)
The maximum revenue loss induced by the optimal n-item menu over all F ∈ F is:
L̂ (n; d) , sup
F∈F
L̂ (F ;n; d) .
5.3.1 Bounds on Revenue Loss
Using the connection between the revenue maximization problem and the vector quantization
problem, we can obtain upper and lower bounds on the revenue loss, as in the social welfare
case. For instance, by using repeated scalar quantization, we obtain the following upper
bound on the revenue loss:
Proposition 10 (Upper Bound on Revenue Loss)
For any F ∈ F , n ≥ 1, d ≥ 1, the revenue loss induced by the optimal n-item menu satisfies:
L̂ (F ;n; d) ≤ d
8 (n1/d − 1)2
, Λ̄.
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As in the welfare case, we can introduce the vector quantization gain provided by the
optimal finite menu for the seller’s revenue. The decomposition result, Theorem 3, naturally
also holds for the revenue problem, and thus we obtain the following vector-quantization-
based upper bound on the revenue loss.
Proposition 11 (Vector-Quantization-Based Upper Bound)
Suppose that the consumer’s types θ1, . . . , θd are identically distributed with the joint distri-
bution function F ∈ F . When n1/d is suffi ciently large,
L̂ (F ;n; d) ≤ 1
SF × S ×DP ×
d
8 (n1/d − 1)2
=
1
SF × S ×DP Λ̄ , Λ̄V Q.
By considering the vector quantization gain specifically for the i.i.d. uniform distribution,
we can obtain a lower bound on the revenue loss. We can then show that the maximum
revenue loss induced by the n-item menu converges to zero at a rate proportional to d
n2/d
as
the number of items n tends to infinity.
Proposition 12 (Revenue Loss for I.I.D. Uniform Distribution)
Suppose the types θ1, . . . , θd are i.i.d. uniformly distributed on [0, 1] with the joint distribution
function FU . If n1/d is suffi ciently large, then







Proposition 13 (Bounds on Maximum Revenue Loss)






)2 ≤ L̂ (n; d) ≤ 18 d(n1/d − 1)2 .
6 Conclusion
We explored the consequences of economic transactions with limited information within the
concrete setting of the nonlinear pricing model. Using the linear-quadratic specification,
we relate both social welfare maximization and revenue maximization to the quantization
problem in information theory. Using this link, we introduce the Lloyd-Max conditions that
the optimal finite menu for the socially effi cient and the revenue-maximizing mechanism must
satisfy. In addition, we study the performance of the finite menus relative to the optimal
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continuous menu. Our analysis shows that for both social welfare and the seller’s revenue,
the losses due to the usage of the n-item finite menu converge to zero at the rate proportional
to 1/n2.
Based on the information-theoretic approach in the one-dimensional environment, we
generalize our results to the multi-product environment. We provide a general upper bound
on the losses for both the social welfare and the seller’s revenue by using the repeated scalar
quantization method. This bound is used to prove that the losses, due to the usage of
the d-dimensional n-item finite menu, converge to zero at the rate proportional to d/n2/d.
Although such treatment is simple and helpful for estimating the order of the convergence
rate of the losses, it ignores some significant features in multi-dimensional mechanism design.
Therefore, we introduce the vector quantization gain and the decomposition theorem, and
obtain a vector-quantization-based upper bound and a lower bound on the welfare loss and
the revenue loss. The vector-quantization-based upper bound is tighter than the repeated
scalar upper bound, and the improvement becomes significant in high dimensions, and/or
when the correlation among the consumer’s preferences over multiple products exists. This
shows that it is beneficial to bundle the consumer’s preferences over multiple goods, and
then design the finite menus jointly in multiple dimensions.
While the nonlinear pricing environment is of interest by itself, it also represents an
elementary instance of the general mechanism design environment. The simplicity of the
nonlinear pricing problem arises from the fact that it can viewed as a relationship between
the principal, here the seller, and a single agent, here the buyer, even in the presence of
many buyers. The reason for the simplicity is that the principal does not have to solve
allocative externalities. By contrast, in auctions, and other multi-agent allocation problems,
the allocation (and hence the relevant information) with respect to a given agent constrains
and is constrained by the allocation to the other agents.
Finally, the current analysis focused on limited information, and the ensuing problem
of effi cient source coding. But clearly, from an information-theoretic as well as economic
viewpoint, it is natural to augment the analysis to reliable communication between agent













































































 dFl (θl) ,
where Al,−kl = A1,k1 × . . .× Al−1,kl−1 × Al+1,kl+1 . . .× Ad,kd ,θ−l = (θ1, . . . , θl−1, θl+1, . . . , θd),



















dF−l (θ−l|θl) = 1,














2 dFl (θl) .
Therefore,













This is true for any set of d independent scalar quantizers {Al,kl , rl,kl}
K
kl=1
∈MFl , 1 ≤ l ≤ d.
If we independently choose the d optimal quantizers for the types θ1, . . . , θd, we obtain the
upper bound:
















which completes the proof.
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